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Abstract: In this paper we reflect on how one police organization, the Dutch police, have 
acted to embrace nodal assemblages and nodal governance while they have pioneered a form 
of ‘conduit policing’ (Shearing, 1999). This strategy, conceived as policing with a ‘nodal 
orientation’, combines policing attention on flows of people, information and things through 
infrastructural nodes with the policing of local communities (Project Group Vision on 
Policing, 2006).  We examine four initiatives of the Dutch police that illustrate different 
aspects of policing assemblages in Amsterdam. The analysis considers how these nodes have 
worked to integrate different, but compatible, conceptions of nodal policing. 
 
Introduction 
Since the mid-20th century police around the world have found themselves faced with what 
O’Connor dubbed ‘the fiscal crises of the state’ (1973), and with what Innes (2010) more 
recently has termed ‘an age of austerity’. Within the context of The Netherlands, this does not 
necessarily mean that the police are low on budget. On the contrary, since 1993, the Dutch 
police have seen considerable growth in both staffing and expenditure (Haagsma et al, 2012).  
However, given the constant political and social focus upon safety and security issues (though 
not necessarily based on ‘hard’ crime figures) and demands for policing, it is possible to argue 
that the public police – even with the significant expansion of staff and resources – have been 
unable to keep pace with the demands they face. Therefore, the Dutch police have reflected on 
how and where to reduce burdens placed upon them while maintaining appropriate levels of 
service. 
 A common response by the Dutch police, and other police forces around the world,  
has been to develop strategies – resonating with neo-liberal mentalities (Ferguson, 2010; 
O’Malley and Palmer, 1996) – that seek to enroll others in ways that will assist the police in 
achieving their security governance objectives by ‘lengthening the arm of the law’ (Ayling et 
al, 2009).  These responses have led police organizations to explore ways of engaging in what 
has been termed ‘nodal policing’ (Bayley and Shearing, 2001; Wood and Shearing, 2005).  In 
the United Kingdom, for example, the move towards an acceptance of nodal forms of policing 
– in which police collaborate with others to provide policing services – is reflected in the use 
of the term ‘the policing family’ (Johnston, 2005) to signify nodal assemblages that work 
together, typically with police playing a leadership or ‘anchoring’ role (Loader and Walker, 
2007) to realize their security governance agendas.  
 In The Netherlands too, we see developments towards nodal forms of policing, often 
termed ‘third-party policing’ (Buerger and Mazerolle, 1998) or ‘partnership policing’ (Wood 
and Bradley, 2009), which have been actively encouraged by the police. In so doing, the 
Dutch Police have drawn upon Castells’ (1996) conception of networked societies and the 
idea that within societies ‘flows’ of people, goods and information often come together at 
infrastructural nodal points. Castells conceived of these processes as ‘spaces of flows’, 
 
 
including, for example, flows of people and things that go through harbors and airports. The 
Dutch police have used Castells’ ideas to develop the idea of policing with a ‘nodal 
orientation’ (Project Group Vision on Policing, 2006). The idea here is that police, and the 
organizational assemblages that they participate in, should shift their attention towards the 
managing of national and global nodes at which flows of people, good and things intersect, 
while continuing their focus on local forms of community-oriented policing.  
In this paper we use the metaphor of ‘team play’, developed by Boutellier and Van 
Steden (2011), to explore how the Dutch police, within the city of Amsterdam, have sought to 
realize forms of nodal oriented policing. The ‘team play’ metaphor refers to the 
improvisational nature of the thinking and practice that the Dutch police have deployed across 
a diverse set of policing settings. After sketching the political and societal trends that have 
sparked the search for nodal forms of policing in The Netherlands, we examine in particular 
four examples of security governance initiatives: (1) policing through spatial control; (2) 
policing through coaching; (3) policing through responsive regulation; and (4) policing hot 
spots and repeat violators. These examples should be considered as archetypal models, since 
things appear to be ‘muddier and messier’ (Lindblom, 1959) on the ground. In fact, the 
models described are, by themselves, products of complex and often ambiguous 
improvisational processes. Therefore, our goal is not to measure the effectiveness and 
efficiency of nodal networks, but to explore how ‘team play’ as a metaphor can help advance 
our understanding of police efforts to become more agile in addressing contemporary 
problems of crime and insecurity. 
In the course of our analysis we seek to engage in a wider conversation about the  
faces of nodal policing, not merely in The Netherlands, but in other parts of the globe (Button, 
2008), and transnationally (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011). This conversation centers on 
questions about the location of police within ‘fields’ (cf. Moore, 1973) of policing. We argue 
that the Dutch police are using nodal forms of policing to enable them to create a more 
rational division of labor within security networks, but also to become more agile as they seek 
to address a broad range of security concerns. In the final part of our paper we briefly discuss 
the analogy of ‘team play’ and improvisation, suggesting an alternative understanding of how 
power operates in the field of security governance.   
 
Policing under pressure 
The Netherlands has for sometime enjoyed a tradition of ‘partnership’ policing. Police 
officers deployed to particular neighborhoods have long sought to encourage the engagement 
of professionals and citizens as active agents in addressing a variety of local crime and safety 
issues. For example, the concept of ‘neighborhood coordination’ (buurtregie), an idea that 
resonates with established conceptions of community policing, has been a feature of police 
practice in Amsterdam since the beginning of the new century. The Amsterdam region has 
been divided, for policing purposes, into 217 neighborhoods, each with its own full-time 
 
 
‘neighborhood coordinator’ (buurtregisseur) – a kind of community policing officer (Van 
Caem et al, 2013). While these officers are, of course, required to respond to offences they 
come across in the course of their duties, their primary responsibility is to prevent crime and 
disorder through engaging those present in their jurisdictions – residents, shopkeepers, pub 
owners, private security guards, social services, business associations, churches and, 
(crucially) local government, from the mayor to the street-cleaners – in forward-looking 
processes intended to anticipate and solve problems. Their focus is on, what Leman-Langlois 
and Shearing (2004) have termed, ‘repairing the future’ so as to ‘make a better tomorrow’ 
(Froestad, 2013) for their neighborhoods. 
 Recently this partnership approach to policing has come under considerable pressure 
as neighborhood coordinators have struggled to meet the high expectations of both citizens 
and policy-makers to perform a range of roles. As Terpstra (2010, p. 70) puts it: 
 
Often it is hardly realistic that one and the same person can fulfill all these demands: 
maintaining relations with members of different (ethnic) groups, restoring trust in the 
police, mediating in conflicts, solving a very wide range of problems of crime and 
disorder, the enforcement of the rule of law, being approachable for citizens, 
maintaining the authority of the police at the street level, cooperating with other 
agencies, offering help and support to people with personal problems, collecting 
relevant information about public safety problems and meeting organizational 
performance targets. 
 
In addition, rising crime rates, terrorist attacks, and the public fears that these developments 
have generated, have fueled concerns that the forms of partnership policing practiced by 
neighborhood coordinators have been overly tolerant of conflict and violence (see for further 
discussion, Downes, 1993; Downes and Van Swaaningen, 2007).  The concern has been that 
policing has been too ‘soft’ in The Netherlands (Das et al, 2007; Punch et al, 2005). Such 
sentiments have played a part in driving a ‘punitive turn’ (Pakes, 2005) in the Dutch criminal 
justice system at the start of the new millennium. This turn has found expression at national 
government levels in the emergence of a ‘tough on crime’ stance that has placed a greater 
emphasis on punishing anti-social behavior, and providing police with more legal tools to 
enhance their coercive capacities. Politicians have taken their cue from the United States, 
deploying a rhetoric of ‘zero tolerance’. Taken together, political and social developments 
have led to legal reforms that have authorized, and thereby encouraged, police officers to 
undertake preventive searches for knives, drugs and other illegal objects on their own 
initiative and to detain people for relatively minor public nuisance offences.  
 Also important in shifting practice has been the popularity of New Public Management 
(NPM) philosophies associated with neo-liberal sensibilities (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). 
Within the Dutch police, new systems of performance management sought to establish 
 
 
‘measurable’, quantitative targets, and placed emphasis on output. This, in turn, stimulated the 
use of fixed penalties and the greater use of arrests by police (Hoogenboezem and 
Hoogenboezem, 2005). Furthermore, on January 1st 2013, the Dutch police completed a move 
towards centralization, which integrates the former 26 police regions within a single national 
force. The main assumption driving this centralization process, accompanied by the hardened 
criminal justice policies over the past decade, has been to improve the effectiveness, 
efficiency, flexibility and transparency of the Dutch police system.  
However, there is little, if any, evidence to suggest that these ‘tougher’ managerial 
strategies have improved citizens’ trust and confidence in the police.  Indeed, research has 
shown that the general public is less satisfied with this ‘harder’ instrumental view of policing 
than they were with the so-called ‘softer’ forms of policing (Terpstra and Trommel, 2009). 
Attempts to turn the officers responsible for community-focused forms of policing into 
‘bandit catchers’ (Brogden and Shearing, 1994), and to send policing ‘sliding back towards 
the central-repressive quadrant’ (Punch et al, 2008, p. 72), may have reduced the 
neighborhood coordinators’ accessibility in neighborhoods, creating an atmosphere that runs 
counter to the close relations between them and citizens that was developed in prior years.   
 The current ‘hyperpoliticization’ (Van Swaaningen, 2005) of safety and security, 
however, has not isolated the police from broader networks of agents in the field of security.  
On the contrary, ‘police forces still cooperate in a variety of local networks and work together 
with all kinds of public and private organizations, in some fields even more intensively than 
before’ (Van Sluis et al, 2008, p. 430).  In response to the high demands for safety and 
security mentioned at the outset, and despite the punitive political turn, the Dutch police have 
continued to reimagine themselves as a ‘new police’, with links to other relevant players at 
local, regional, national and international levels.  
In what follows we explore the ways in which police organizations within a Dutch 
context – in particular the Amsterdam police – have established linkages to private actors, 
such as commercial security guards and street coaches, as a strategy to enhance the policing 
resource pool.  In particular, we examine the nature of these emerging ‘police assemblages’ 
(Brodeur, 2010), the ways in which they have been managed and coordinated, and the logics 
and associated policing styles that have emerged. Before considering these issues, we lay out 
the Dutch interpretation of nodal policing, a view that is founded on an understanding that the 
police are simply one player, albeit an important one (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wood 
and Shearing, 2007), in the field of urban safety.   
 
Policing with a nodal orientation 
Dutch police leaders and policing scholars have been active in assessing the impact of new, 
and emerging, security threats and their implications for the ‘structure of policing’ (Bayley 
and Shearing, 2001).  A central challenge posed by these threats relates to the ways in which 
security issues at the local level are tied to criminal nodes and networks operating nationally 
 
 
and transnationally (see also Dupont, 2012). This concern with threats and their challenges 
were well articulated in the 2006 Dutch report ‘Police in Evolution’ (Politie in Ontwikkeling): 
 
Because of the significant increase in the mobility of people, goods and information, 
local, interurban and international safety has become more and more intertwined 
because open borders, freedom of mobility and computerization offer opportunities 
not only to entrepreneurs and citizens, but also to criminal individuals, organizations 
or networks…This has [led to] crime and increasingly international affairs that can no 
longer be traced back to one single state jurisdiction (Project Group Vision on Policing 
2006, p. 21-22). 
 
In response to the fluidity of criminal behavior across space, the Dutch police have, as we 
noted earlier, chosen to focus much of their gaze on flows of people, goods, money and 
information that can create opportunities for local breaches of security. These infrastructural 
nodes, such as airports, seaports, railways, highways and internet servers, constitute crucial 
sites for police engagement because they provide the infrastructures that enable people, 
information and commodities to travel across time and space. Policing with a nodal 
orientation is defined as 
 
… the intensive control and monitoring of infrastructure and the flow of people, goods 
and money that move along the various forms of this infrastructure. The police act 
where flows across infrastructures arrive at particular places, such as at the nodes in 
the infrastructure networks. Each movement of flow and infrastructure requires 
specific applications for police interventions that fit the characteristics of the particular 
type of flow or infrastructure (Van Sluis et al, 2011, p. 366). 
 
What this definition implies – as the 2006 Report itself and the practices that have emerged 
from it make clear – is that for police to achieve this policing mandate, they need to establish 
collaborative networks. One of the sets of practices, which we explore further below, has been 
the development of new policing practices to police nodal flows through ‘high-tech’ 
applications, which automatically observe and register vehicles moving on ring roads around 
cities while comparing data found with a wide range of databases (e.g. unpaid fines, known 
suspects). An example is the control of infrastructural nodes that serve as access or exit 
points, such as the use of traffic controls on highways. This experimental policing 
arrangement has allowed the police to compromise people’s invisibility and anonymity. 
Criminals and other unwanted persons can now be identified when entering a local area. In 
the (near) future, mobile technologies may even allow police to directly alert private security 
personnel working in businesses to the presence of known shoplifters in the area, which 
encourages local guards to ‘assist’ would-be shoplifters to pay for goods. The policing of 
 
 
infrastructure thus necessitates the involvement of other players within security nodal 
networks. 
 The nodal orientation of the Dutch police described above is an addendum to a more 
traditional focus on local neighborhoods and communities: it ‘combines a perspective on 
policing in infrastructural networks with one that considers the police a player in… security 
networks’ (Van Sluis et al, 2011, p. 365). This decision to concentrate more closely on ‘joined 
up’ (Crawford and Lister, 2004) police work by involving various partners is not new. As 
early as 1985, the White Paper entitled ‘Society and Crime: A Policy Plan for the Future’ 
(Samenleving en criminaliteit: Een beleidsplan voor de komende jaren) clearly foreshadowed 
that the Dutch police have come to depend heavily on the cooperation of different 
organizations, both public and private (Punch et al, 2002). The White Paper promoted the 
‘functional coordination’ between state and non-state bodies in the provision of public safety.  
In the White Paper, neighborhood residents are, among others, conceived of as ‘responsible 
associates’ in creating and maintaining a safe and livable social environment. From the early 
1990s onwards, ‘responsibilization’ strategies (Garland, 1996) have been further confirmed 
by the Dutch government’s wider emphasis on ‘integral safety’, which highlights 
organizational responses that cut vertically through state agencies and horizontally through 
non-state sectors to form assemblages of governance. Within such assemblages, flows of 
power from one node to another are understood as de-centered and multidirectional, rather 
than as top-down and unidirectional.  
 This conception of power resonates with both Foucault’s (1984/1992) and Latour’s 
(1987) conception of power as having multiple sources – that is, as coming from everywhere.  
Latour illuminates this conception nicely through his analogy of a rugby game, where the 
outcome of the game is not determined by who takes, and who accepts or intercepts the first 
kick, but rather by how the ball moves through the field of action throughout the entire game. 
The course of the game is shaped by all those who make contact with the ball and all those 
who influence this. To be a governing node, as Latour’s illustration – along with the metaphor 
of ‘team play’ – makes clear, an agent (be it a person or an agency), if it is to be able to act as 
a policing node within a wider network, must be capable of influencing the ‘flow of events’ 
(Parker and Braithwaite, 2003) with respect to security. In other words: a governing node 
must have the capacity ‘to regulate self-regulating governance networks by shaping the 
conditions under which they operate’ (Sørenson and Torfing, 2005, p. 202). In seeking to 
become what might be thought of as a ‘nodal police’ – an idea that the Victoria Police in 
Australia referenced through the term ‘nexus policing’ (Wood, 2006) – the Dutch police have 
not only continued to act as a crucial node themselves but have, in seeking to foster and steer 
the direction of nodal assemblages, also emerged as a facilitator of networked forms of 
policing.  
 
 
 
 
Four examples 
Keeping in mind the above context, we turn now to four concrete examples of ‘team play’, 
which have given life to the Dutch vision of policing with a nodal orientation. We draw these 
examples from our empirical studies in Amsterdam. 
 
Policing through spatial control 
The first example of policing with a nodal orientation aims to control the open spaces between 
urban areas and the wider world (Project Group Vision on Policing, 2006; Van Sluis et al, 
2011).  Over the past few years, the Dutch police have experimented with the installation, and 
deployment, of ‘smart’ ring-road cameras and Automatic Number Plate Recognition 
technologies used to detect and register all vehicles that enter the city. The system checks the 
vehicle and personal details against various other databases (municipal, police and tax office). 
This initiative, designed to govern flows of people and goods through space, represents a 
sophisticated form of ‘sorting’ and ‘gating’ that is not dissimilar to the use of, for example, 
magnetic swipe cards and biometric iris recognition in high security facilities. Via the 
installation of such technologies across Amsterdam, the Dutch police’s objective has been to 
identify, limit and intercept ‘the mobility of “evil”’ (Project Group Vision on Policing, 2006, 
p. 78) by using visual recording equipment – mostly CCTV cameras – to undermine the 
anonymity and invisibility of known suspects.  
 The interaction between these technologies and neighborhood coordinators is 
purported to enhance the Dutch emphasis on local communities by using information 
technology to inform coordinators of threats, like suspicious vehicles and people entering the 
city. Following the 2006 Report, 
 
… the notion ‘from your local neighborhood to the world at large’ means in particular 
that there is a relationship between the different levels on which safety can be 
organized. For individual police officers and for the police as an organization this 
means in practice that whenever there are national objectives (e.g. fighting terrorism), 
local activities are expressly placed in the context of these broader safety objectives 
(Project Group Vision on Policing, 2006, p. 21-22). 
 
As such, the Dutch police emphasize that there should be clarity between various partners 
about their perceptions of threats and their respective responsibilities in improving public 
safety and security. In line with the examples noted above, the police utilize mobile 
technologies to inform citizens and other stakeholders of information gathered by sending text 
messages, through an initiative called SMS-alert (Korteland and Bekkers, 2007). The 
intention is to enroll third parties, as co-producers of community safety, to engage with the 
police, in the recognition, anticipation and prevention of local crime and disorder.  This 
constitutes an innovative program that seeks to promote the process of ‘knowing and being 
 
 
known’, and which involves the police entering into relationships with citizens and 
organizations – both public and private – for the purpose of exchanging information (Ericson 
and Haggerty, 1997; Ayling et al, 2009). Community safety programs thereby integrate with 
national and even global or transnational levels of policing with a strong emphasis on 
prevention. 
  
Policing through coaching 
The second example we will consider is the deployment of ‘street coaches’ who engage with 
disorderly youngsters on the streets of Amsterdam. These coaches, provided by a commercial 
security firm and employed by a private foundation – a civil society entity – under contract 
with the city council, have been conceived of as ‘filling the gap’ between reactive policing 
strategies and preventive youth care. The central idea underlying this initiative was to bring 
together the worlds of policing and community-based care in an effort to reduce the problem 
of youth ‘hanging around’ (Van Steden and Jones, 2008). Street coaches work in conjunction 
with ‘home helpers’ (private social workers directly working for the foundation) who visit the 
parents of youngsters in trouble.  The coaches, who have no judicial and related powers (e.g. 
they may not issue fines), cycle through Amsterdam neighborhoods and boroughs to reduce 
the extent to which youth engage in activities that constitute a ‘nuisance’.   
 One strategy that both street coaches and home helpers employ is to activate 
(problematic) youth and their parents, as local regulators, through signed agreements, to 
commit to reforming their behaviors. A consequence of these agreements is that parents are 
made more aware of their children’s misconduct and are encouraged, as parents, to play a 
greater supervisory role of their children. This use of self-regulation within communities has a 
long history and is found in a variety of guises in different places across the globe (see, for 
example, Froestad, 2013). In addition to providing a visible presence on the streets of 
Amsterdam, coaches and helpers guide troublesome youth through a range of complex, and 
sometimes contradictory, set of bureaucratic services and regulatory provisions. The hope has 
been that this initiative would streamline multifarious youth programs into a more integrated, 
simpler and efficient set of processes.    
As the daily work of street coaches illuminates, ‘capable guardians’ (Cohen and 
Felson, 1979) in local neighborhoods are not necessarily police. In this instance, although 
police officers are involved in the wider security network as neighborhood coordinators, they 
tend to remain in the background.  They see their role less as offering services directly, and 
more as guarantors of order who act to ensure that networks of capable guardians exist and 
are operating to promote safety (see also Wood and Marks, 2007). Their role is primarily to 
provide informational support for the coaches and helpers by providing back-up support in 
cases where the unique legal authority and coercive capacity of the police is required (see 
Shearing and Leon, 1976). Particularly noteworthy in the case of street coaches is the fact that 
the vast bulk of the infrastructure is provided by a private foundation. Street coaches thus act 
 
 
‘in the shadow of the law’ (Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979), meaning that they maintain 
public order on behalf of government agencies that remain in the background, but that are 
ultimately in control.  
 
Policing through responsive regulation 
Our third example is that of the Flying Squads (Vliegende Brigades) that are routinely 
deployed across Amsterdam (De Groot and Van Steden, 2011; Van Steden and Stekelenburg, 
2010). Flying Squads are made up of police, health care service officials, and social workers 
under the political authority of the municipal enforcement department. As a component of 
Flying Squads, municipal enforcement officers (see below) work under the operational 
direction of police officers, most notably neighborhood coordinators. Municipal 
responsibilities within this policing arrangement originated as an initiative designed primarily 
to address long-term unemployment in 1989. Lacking any police powers, city wardens 
(stadswachten) were deployed to perform a security governance function through their visible 
presence as agents and via the provision of information to tourists and residents in Dutch 
cities (Hauber et al, 1996).  Again, schemes such as this can be found in different incarnations 
elsewhere, for instance, the use of downtown ambassadors in the United States, Canada and 
Australia (Sleiman and Lippert, 2010). In The Netherlands, the national government has 
sought to professionalize city wardens over the past few years. They are now regarded as 
‘municipal enforcement officers’, as professional order maintenance personnel holding 
limited police powers.   
 Flying Squads embody flexible teams that, akin to street coaches and home helpers, 
are intended to act to reduce nuisance behavior. Within these Squads, municipal enforcement 
officers are uniformed officials who posses powers that enable them to issue on-the-spot 
penalties for anti-social conduct, such as public urination, public drunkenness and 
intoxication. Some of these officers carry handcuffs, though their coercive powers are more 
limited than those of Dutch police officers. Municipal enforcement officers, like the Police 
Community Support Officers (PCSOs) in Britain, provide a second tier of ‘police’ who are 
appointed to undertake street patrols and apply a problem-solving approach to crime and 
disorder (Johnston, 2005). Unlike PCSOs, Dutch municipal enforcement officers are 
employed by local government, not by a police authority. Their work can nevertheless be 
situated in debates about ‘security governance’ (Johnston and Shearing, 2003) and the 
‘pluralization’ or ‘multilateralization’ (Bayley and Shearing, 2001) of policing, referring to 
the rise of visible (quasi-)policing professionals alongside the blue-colored state police. 
 The emergence of Flying Squads must be interpreted against the background of 
widespread unease about low-level, but annoying, disturbances like public drunkenness, drug 
abuse and panhandling in Amsterdam. Two important policy objectives of Flying Brigades 
are (a) to tackle problems caused by, among others, (homeless) drug addicts through imposing 
fixed penalties upon them, and (b) to offer vulnerable people personal and medical care if 
 
 
necessary. These goals translate into combining strategies of care with harder edged policing 
tactics to provide both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ models (cf. Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). By 
using the ‘soft power’ of social workers who work to convince people like drug addicts to 
visit doctors or a rehabilitation center, the Squad typically initiates its interventions at the base 
of the enforcement pyramid. If a gentle approach – what Braithwaite (1997) terms ‘speaking 
softly’ – fails, then municipal enforcement officers, who carry a ‘small stick’ in the form of 
the ability to impose fines, are able to escalate matters up the pyramid.  In the course of taking 
these various actions, the Squad is able to build up dossiers outlining their lower-level actions, 
which enable them to escalate matters to the top of the pyramid by eventually mobilizing the 
police officers within the Squad, who have the power to arrest offenders – Braithwaite’s ‘big 
stick’.  
 
Policing hot spots and repeat violators 
Our fourth and final example is a neighborhood safety team (buurtveiligheidsteam) program 
in Amsterdam. A major principle of this program is that both the police and the municipality 
invest in a targeted approach to public disorder in local urban areas. Although the municipal 
enforcement department is in political control, as with the previous examples, police are 
recognized as the team leader. A neighborhood coordinator, who is assisted by a police 
colleague and two municipal enforcement officers, form a team. Depending on the issues 
being addressed, teams are supplemented by others, such as private security guards, street 
coaches, caretakers, and youth workers. Since February 2008, when the program was 
initiated, four teams have been active in the northern and eastern parts of Amsterdam. Their 
purpose has been to improve the ‘quality of life’ in appointed neighborhoods by addressing 
(minor) safety problems such as litter, illegal parking and troublesome youth.  
 The most striking element of the teams’ working method is that residents have a direct 
say by identifying ‘hot spots’ and other pressing local disorder problems. On account of 
people’s complaints and concerns about public nuisance and antisocial behavior, professionals 
adopt a focused policy on the most ‘prominent’ people (notorious lawbreakers) and places 
(such as disorderly squares and drug scenes) in town (Van Stokkom, 2013). This policy has 
been inspired by British experiments with ‘reassurance policing’ (Innes, 2004) and expresses 
the business principles of Intelligence-Led Policing by focusing resources on the most 
harmful people and places (Ratcliffe, 2008). As part of the processes initiated by the teams, 
neighborhood coordinators frequently set up interactive gatherings of citizens, drawn from a 
mixture of community groups, to promote dialogue, active listening and feedback about 
pressing safety issues. In addition to formal gatherings, neighborhood coordinators also 
organize other channels of communication, such as surveys and e-mail exchanges. The 
gatherings between professionals and citizens approximate the ‘beat meetings’ Skogan (2006) 
studied in Chicago. 
 
 
 
Improvisation 
Our purpose so far has not been evaluative, but rather suggestive of the agility and nodal 
imagination of the Dutch Police in larger ‘teams’ of security governance players. In the above 
examples, we hope to have made clear the fact that the Dutch police are now routinely 
positioned within assemblages of resources to collectively address security issues. Our 
examples reveal that such network engagement can, and does, take place, with the police – 
neighborhood coordinators in particular – mostly playing a central role. At the same time, 
however, the municipality of Amsterdam also takes up a pivotal position in shaping team 
play. Team leaders vary, depending on the problem at hand, and the logic deployed to address 
it. Due to this morphing character, the position of police within security networks is 
sometimes stable, but often it is not.  
 The challenge for nodes, including the police and municipal agencies, has therefore 
been to determine which assemblages work best for different types of problems. Depending 
on the nature of the problem, questions arise as to who should take which positions within a 
policing field, and what the rules of the game should be (Ayling et al, 2009). The Dutch 
police have begun to consider these issues, but to date have done so in a rather improvised 
fashion in which the enrollment and alignment of third parties are central features of 
community safety (Boutellier, forthcoming). Nodal team work, much similar to the 
improvisations of a jazz ensemble,  
 
 … emerges as an important medium for exhibiting as well as a means of conceiving 
 and (re)enacting interpersonal relationships. It derives particularly ‘from the force of 
 the context, one that challenges players, listeners and all those caught up in its social 
 field, to reevaluate the “space” in which the conjoined activities of making music and 
 community happen’ (Fischlin cited in Cobussen, 2008, p. 54). 
  
As we alluded to earlier, such experiments have been happening simultaneously, and in 
parallel with the move to introduce tougher forms of policing. In practice, as Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s (1992) picture of a regulatory pyramid shows, governance arrangements 
function as a sort of incremental ‘regulatory pyramid’. This pyramid is most obvious in the 
case of the Flying Squads, but lies concealed in the other examples too. Coercive measures of 
law enforcement are merely seen as an ultimum remedium, as a last straw. If citizens, social 
workers, home helpers, street coaches, municipal law enforcement officers and other partners 
in community safety fail to solve problems and restore public order, the police can be brought 
into action (Boutellier and Van Steden, 2011). Neighborhood coordinators and other police 
colleagues are, at any moment, capable of intervening when escalation up the pyramid is 
required. 
The above examples suggest that although the Dutch police are certainly being 
encouraged to make greater use of their ‘big stick’, this has not meant that neighborhood 
 
 
coordinators are not continuing to be very active at the bottom end of the regulatory pyramid 
where they, and the policing assemblages they are a part of, speak much more softly. The 
police are essential players because of their big sticks, but oftentimes, these can be 
subordinated to softer tools used by other nodal players. Within nodal networks, police 
officers, like the neighborhood coordinators we considered, act in ways that fully recognize 
that ‘what works’ (hard and soft) depends on the situation.  
 
Conclusions 
A vital development within the governance of security has been the mobilization of resources 
outside of state bureaucracies in the pursuit of safety and security. This is a strategy that 
citizens, corporations and non-profit organizations have used to create nodal assemblages that 
stretch beyond states’ resources and capacities. The Dutch government generally, and the 
Dutch police specifically, have actively designed and implemented policies to identify, 
enhance, mobilize and integrate a wide variety of capacities – both local and national – in 
pursuing their security governance agendas. In considering how this has been done, our 
examples show that the emergence of the nodal assemblages that now define Dutch policing 
evolved through a number of innovative and opportunistic processes that have, and are 
continuing to, profoundly reshaped policing and police work.  We have argued, via an 
analysis of actions taken by the police in Amsterdam, that a variety of different developments, 
which share a distinct ‘family resemblance’ (Wittgenstein, 1953/2001) are collectively 
reshaping Dutch policing by moving it in a nodal direction.  
 In summary, policing operates in many forms, with different entities taking up various 
positions in the field of action in which security nodes operate. As we have seen in the case of 
neighborhood coordinators, the police may play a central role in managing assemblages. In 
such instances they act as a coordinating hub that determines what security capacities exist 
within a policing field and decides ‘who should do what’ to reduce crime and disorder. The 
nodal assemblages that are emerging within the Netherlands and elsewhere have experienced, 
and continue to present, difficult challenges with respect to coordination.  Our examples 
illustrate that these challenges are being explored through the innovative and experimental 
processes. In the developments taking place, what we are witnessing is the Dutch police 
playing an active role in the shaping, but not controlling of the emergence of nodal security 
arrangements in the Netherlands. In our case illustrations we have confirmed that power, as 
Foucault and Latour have advised, operates both horizontally and vertically. Through their 
security assemblages, the police may govern us more indirectly (although perhaps no less 
effectively) than ever before. 
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